Recent Fertility in Mexico: Measurement and Interpretation by Seiver, Daniel
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
10-1-1974 
Recent Fertility in Mexico: Measurement and Interpretation 
Daniel Seiver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Seiver, Daniel, "Recent Fertility in Mexico: Measurement and Interpretation" (1974). Discussion Papers. 
222. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/222 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECOIJOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
'(t.LE UNIVERSITY 
Box 1187, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 
C'.EHTF:R DISCUSSION PAPf.R NO. 214 
Septemher 1q74 
RECElJT fERTILITY Pf !·n:::nco: rtr:ASURE.i1f.NT A:rn DJTERPRETATION 
Daniel A. Seiver 
;lctc: r~enter Discussion Papers are preliminar.1 materials. circulated to
stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publica­
tions to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the authors to
protect the tentative character of these papers. 
RECENT FERTILITY IN MEXICO: MEASUREMENT AND INTERPRETATION~':+ 
Mexican fertility has remained at a high level (a crude birth rate 
of 42-46) in spite of rapid economic development and its concomitants: 
rising levels of urbanization, education, income, and female labor force 
participation, and falling levels of infant mortality and agricultural 
population, combined with rural to urban migration. All of these changes 
are theorized to exert downward pressure on a nation's birth rate. The 
theory of the "demographic transition" (DT) may have to be modified to 
fit the Mexican case. 
1 Proponents of the theory of the DT have calculated 
"thresholds" for variables such as percent of population in agriculture, 
percent literate, and per capita newspaper circulation. Exceeding these 
thresholds will supposedly result in rapid fertility decline, although 
no ' 1 h anism in. i 'f" d 
2 Mexico has reached or isparticu ar causa1 mec . 'denti ie. 
very close to all of the "thresholds" with an unchanging birth rate. The 
result, in the face of rapidly declining death rates, is an acceleration 
of the Mexican population _growth rate to over 3% per year. The most 
recent vital statistics for Mexico (1972) show a crude birth rate of 43. 8 
3
and a crude death rate of 8.8. 
+This research was supported by grant No. 740-0063 from the Ford Founda-
tion. 
..,: 
Earlier drafts of this paper were improved substantially by the comments 
of Simon Kuznets, Harvard University, and Mark Rosenzweig and T. Paul Schultz, 
Yale University. I also received capable research assistance from Jose Antonio 
Ocampo. Any remaining errors are due to some sinister force. 
1This theory was developed ex-post to explain the demographic experience 
of the now-developed countries. It is still not completely clear whether birth 
and death rates fell or rose in England in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. In France, the birth rate decline may have preceeded the decline in 
the death rate. 
2Dudley Kirk, "A New Demographic Transition?" in Rapid Population Growth 
Vol. II, pp. 123-147. 
3office of Population Research, Population Index (July, 1973), p. 480 
and graph on back cover. 
2 
Rapid population growth in Mexico is certainly no longer a blessing, 
if it ever was. Isbister has recently calculated, in a aggregative frame­
work, the substantial benefits to Mexico of a reduced rate of population 
growth. 
4 
The source of these benefits is a reduction in the dependency 
ratio which will generate more savings. L. Belmont and F.A. Marolla 
have also shown recently the costs at the household level of large families, 
in terms of decreasing ability of high-order children to absorb human 
.capita.l 5 
In order to shed light on the Mexican puzzle of a high birth rate 
coexisting with rapid economic development, this paper will examine the 
following two questions: Are aggregate fertility measures masking a 
decline in age- or region-specific fertility? and, if fertility has not 
declined, can we interpret this phenomenon by explaining cross-sectional 
variations in fertility, which do exist, in terms of the demographic 
transition variables? 
The Data 
The three sources of data in this study are: the 1960 Census of 
Population, 6 the 1970 Census of Population,
7 and the Statistical Annual 
for 1968-1969. 
8 The quality of Mexican demographic data is considered to be 
Lf"Birth Control, Income Redistribution, and the Rate of Saving: The 
Case of Mexico," Demography (February, 1973), pp. 85-98. 
511 Birth Order, Family Size, and Intelligence,'' Science ( December 14, 
· 1973), pp. 995-1003. The variable actually measured is IQ test performance 
6VIII Censo General de Poblacion, 1960. Direccion General de Estadistica, 
Mexico City, 1953. 
7 IX Censo General de Poblacion, 1970. Direccion General de Estadistica, 
Mexico City, 1971. 
8Anuario Estadistico de las Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1968-1969. 
Direccion General de Estadistica, Mexico, 1971. 
3 
above average hv LDC standards. 9 Nonetheless, there are errors in measures 
of fertility: estimates of crude birth rates suffer from under-reportinr 
and delayed registration; numbers of children 0-4 may be heavily under­
enumerated arid reflect also the incidence of infant mortality which may also 
be under-reported. Neither a crude birth rate nor a ratio of children 
0-4 to women 15-49 allows us to attack the problem of trends in age-specific 
10 
fertility rates, either at the national level, or at the state level. 
However, the number of children-ever-born ( CEB) to women in various age 
groups is available from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses. Women still in their 
fertile years are less likely to "forget" children, and the CEB measure 
avoi.dsthe problem of t he d'irect effect of in. f ant .morta1·ity. ll 
In Table 1 on page 4, unadjusted child-woman·ratios (CWR) are reported 
for Mexico and for all the states of Mexico for 1960 and 1970. The increase 
in the ratio for all the Mexico cannot be completely explained by declining 
12
in 1· an derenumeration.. f ant morta ity d un · 
9 see D. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates of 
Historical Trends and Fluctuations (Berkeley, 1965) pp. 138-149. 
10Mexico is divided into 32 federal entities (states) which are the units 
of cross-sectional analysis in this study. 
11Infant mortality may be either positively or negatively related to 
fertility: positive, if parents set a target number of surviving children, 
but perhaps negative, if the investment good nature of children overwhelms 
the first effect. 
12overall infant mortality for Mexico fell from about 78 per thousand 
live births in 1955-59 to 64 in 1965-69. See Population Index, op. cit., 
p. 482. Inflating the CWR's by these figures gives 786 and 813, respectively, 




Child-Woman Ratios for the States of Mexico 
1960 and 1970 
1960 1970 
Children Females Children Females 
0-4 15-49 Ratio 0-4 15-49 Ratio 
A. CALIEH. 40,884 53,475 765 59,946 72,785 824 
B. CALIF. 93,849 113,830 824 145,406 197 ,1~83 736 
B. CAL(TER) 14,081 17,435 808 21,948 26,678 823 
CAMPECHE 27,273 37,981 718 41,045 56,734 723 
760COAHUILA 148,397 203,368 730 186,026 244,647 
COLIMA 27,848 .36,053 772 1a,131 51,250 80
3 
CHIAPAS 205,431 273,168 752 267,913 350,529 
764 
273,046 252,665 772CHIHUAHUA 210,519 276,043 763 
D. F. 785,071 l,2tW,075 633 1,054,123 1,742,568 
505 
DUPJi.HGO 132,228 164,452 804 169,165 193,092 
876 
401,501 476,774 8Lf2GUANAJUATO 294,937 377,610 781 791
GUERRERO 193,906 271,032 715 275,269 348,021 
HIDALGO 163, 31~4 220,349 741 202,836 253,359 
801 
571,229 719,837 794JALISCO 420,152 551,959 729 
MEXICO 322,517 409,537 788 705,677 821,583 
859 
401, 04L~ 487,602 822MICHOACAN 307,859 407,331 756 
735 102,067 136,087 750MORELOS 63,653 86,559 
111,708 842NAYARIT 65,598 85,115 771 94,016 
NUEVO Ll_..:QN 172,968 254,612 679 287,153 383,383
 . 749 
OAXACA 267,504 398,967 670 327,264 445,329 
735 
PUEBLA 320,501 441+, 263 721 415,002 553,148 750 
88,121 100,659 875QUERET/1RO 60,314 77,471 779 
903 16,648 18,481 901QUI1TT:'\l11'. ROO 9,332 10,330 
270,236 826
SA1'-IL. POTOSI 179,995 230,165 782 223,328 
SINALOA 141,192 182,980 772 221,361 265,531 
834 
SONORA 134,051 176,128 761 180,038 242
, 9l+Q 741 
139,606 161,809 863TABASCO 89,649 107,432 834 
706 21+4 ,446 327,402 747TAMAULIPAS 167,800 237,603 
TLAXCALA 58,886 73,101 805 71,277 85
,442 834 
642,566 857,772 750VERACRUZ 441,154 628,586 702 
YUCATAN 88,585 140,999 628 114,923 173
,433 6f.3 
ZACATECAS 145,279 174,745 831 181,383 188,570
 962 
725 8,167,510 10,718,537 762TOTAL 5,776,767 7,963,154 
Source: 1%0 and 1970 Census of Population 
5 
There are, however, 3 states which show significant declines in CWR's 
between 1960 and 1970: the Federal District, Baja California, and Sonora. 
Given reductions in infant mortality and underenumeration, this appears 
to show a definite decline in fertility in these states. However, measuring 
fertility in these states by numbers of children ever born to women of 
various ages seems to tell a different story. In Appendix Table Al, the 
distribution of women by numbers of children-ever-born, for 5-year age 
groups, for 1960 and 1970, is reported for the Federal District and for 
Baja California. The identical tables for a less advanced state are also 
reported for comparison. Also measured is the mean number of children 
ever born (CEB) for the 25-29 year olds in 1960 and 1970. Before concluding 
that fertility has risen in Baj a California and the Federal District, it 
must be noted that rural migration to these states has no doubt influenced 
the CEB figures. Estimating gross migration flows as a percent of resident 
population, and measuring CEB 's in backward states, makes it likely that 
migration flows cannot account for the entire rise in fertility, or at 
13 3best, resident fertility remained constant between 1960 and 1970. ' l a 
This evidence of constant fertility in states whose child-woman ratios 
13 · -· If in each state resident fertility, as measured by the CEB in_l960 
remained constant through the 1960 1s, it is possible to calculate the CEB 
of migrants 1960-1970 that would raise the 1960 CEB of the Federal District 
and Baja California to their 1970 levels. Using the Census data on pap;e 
6, it is easily seen that net migration to the Federal District for 25-29 
year olds in 1970 was vers.J small: 261,054 15-19 year olds in 1960, and 
270,963 25-29 year olds in 1970. Gross migration 1960-1970 tn the city 
was higher, perhaps 10% of the 1970 population. It is easy to calculate 
that the migrants (10%) would need a CEB of 3. 920 to raise the D. F. CEB 
to 2.395, and for Baja California, with 30% migrants, a CEB of 3.787 would 
be required. The two states which sent the most gross migrants 1960-1970, 
to the Federal District and Baja California, were Jalisco (CEB = 3.073) 
and Mexico ( CEB = 3. 264). 
13
~he largest changes in Table 2 between 1960 and 1970 are declines 
in the percentages childless. Increasing fecundity and reductions in 
natural child spacinis arricmcr M,,.~; can walT!en crmld offs~t tendencies tc-w·a:r,-;_ 
fertility reduction. The biological approach is stressed by R.B. Tabbarah, 
''Toward a Theory of Demographic Development", Economic Development and 
Cultural Change (January, 1971), pp. 257-276. 
6 
to have fallen could be explained by interstate migration of womenseems 
of childhearing ages who leave their young children behind. 
14 
It is probably true that age-specific or region-specific fertility 
15 
declines are not being masked by the constant crude birth rate. It may 
be possible to shed light on this phenomenon of constant fertility over 
time by explaining the cross-sectional fertility differentials that do 
exist in Mexico. Using as explanatory variables measures of characteristics 
associated with the DT, we may be able to determine if these variables 
have their hypothesized effects on fertility, at least in cross-sect1ons in 
1960 and 1970. 
as theChild-woman ratios for the states of Mexico have been chosen 
dependent variable for cross-sectional fertility analysis. I believe these 
ratios, when corrected by estimated underenumeration and infant mortality, 
superior to the CEB statistics for women in the childbearing years.are 
Althoup;h young women are less likely to "forget" children, "forgetting" 
still exists and probably not randomly. In particular, mothers may be prone 
to "forget" children who die in infancy. In lir;ht of the deficiencies 
14This phenomenon may explain some of the rises in the advanced. 
states, but the CEB for all of Mexico also rose between 1960 and 1970. 
For the 25-29 year olds, CEB in 1970 was 3. 065, compared with 2. 664 in 
1960. This 15% rise is also further proof that age-specific fertility 
has not been declining in Mexico. There were also rises for the 20-24 
year olds and 30-34 year olds. 
15 h 0 1 · . M . . h. d bTe evidence o f constant f erti· ity in .ex1co is strengt en y 
corrected estimates of the child-woman ratio for Mexico for 1960 and 1970 
of 859 and 883. (Dinamica de la Poblacion de Mexico, [Mexico City, 1~70], 
Cuadro III-13, p. 60). Correcting for infant mortality decline in the 
interim still leaves a small increase. It is possible that the 1960 's saw 
some decline in age-specific rates in Mexico City for the 30-34 year olds. 
See Dinamica de la Poblacion de Mexico, op. cit., p. 55. Raul Benitez 
Zenteno and Gustavo Cabrera Acevedo, Proyecciones de la Poblacion de 
Mexico 1960-1980, (Mexico, 1966), have estimated age-specific fertility 
rates for the states of Mexico for 1960, (pp. 104-106) based on official 
birth statistics. In general the rates are very similar to the unadjusted 
1960 CWR's. Estimates of underenumeration of the 0~4 1960 population are 
also made (pp. 77-80). I believe these estimates are inferior to those 
used by Roberts (see below). Two examples are Federal District 12% under­
Pnum~:r.:=i.t:ion, anrl 011j_nt;m~ Roo ~n~':; overerrnm~ra-t:ir:in, ('J,::,;:i,...1v i.ric;11ff'J~iar,t 
allowance has been made for underreporting of births (Quintana Roo) and 
underestimates of inmir,ration (Federal District). 
noted above, however, it is necessary to adjust child-wonan ratios to 
ratios to reflect the "true" and unobserved fertility. It has ·also been 
noted that official statistics of infant mortality are not reliable. But 
16 ·
Roberts has recently reported on corrected levels of infant mortality 
by the state in Mexico in 1960. These corrected rates can be used to 




Regional variations in underenumeration, which are substantial, are 
more difficult to deal with. Roberts
18 has also measured the degree of 
These estimates mayunderreporting of infant mortality in Mexico in 1960. 
be good proxies for the degree of underenumeration of children 0-4 in 
Mexico. The dependent variable, after adjustment, is: 
(1) ACWR. = [ CWR./(1-m.) ] • (1 + u.)
J J J J 
where: ACWR.
J 
= adjusted child-woman ratio for state j in 1970 (or 1960) 
CWRj - measured child-woman ratio for state j in 1970 (or 1960) 
rn.
J 
= corrected infant mortality rate for state j in 1970 (or 1960) 
u.
J 
= percent of underreporting of infant mortality for state j in 
1960. 
19 
Rath0r tl-ian simply use both of Pd)erts' e3timatcs to inflate the 1'170 
r:;n:',;, it is possiLle to allow for changing infant mortality in t:1e interim 
per.i od by combining Roberts' underenumeration estimotes with officia} 
infant mortality rates averaged over 1965-19(:,7. Thus 
16Robert E. Roberts, "Modernization and Infant Mortality in Mexico," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change (July, 1973), pp. 655-669. 
17 . ·Mortality at ages 1-4 years is low enough to be safely ignored. 
180 .~- cit.
19Schultz has argued that lagged values of infant mortality have a 
positive influence on current fertility. Love and Life Between the Censuses: 
A Model of Family Decision Making in Puerto Rico, 1950-1960, Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 1970. Unfortunately, adequate time series for infant mortality 
by state do not exist. Thus the one observation on infant mortality for 1960 
has been used to inflate the child-woman ratios for 1960 and 1970. Mexican 
infant mortality has been declining for 70 years (from 300 per thousand live 
births to 64 per thousand) with no apparent effect on birth rates. It is true 
that its influence on fertility could be more subtle, but I prefer to attack the 
problem with child-woman ratios, forfeiting an opportunity to test the cross­
sectional effect of infant mortality. 
8 
Uni'ortunately, it is not possible to inflate the 1970 CWR' s by a 1970 
measure of underenumeration, and thus the 1960 measure is used in 1970. 
This may introduce a small bias in the results, in that the overall degree 
of underenumeration has declined a little between 1960 and 1970. The 
advanced states had already in 1960 0% underenumeration, while the most 
backward probably had decreases in this measure. The probable effect of 
this bias on the 1970 regressions is discussed below. 
The unadjusted and adjusted child-woman ratios for each state are 
presented in Table 2 on page g with the'estimated infant mortality rates 
and underenumeration percentage for each state for 1960 and 1970. 
A cursory examination of the ACWR' s for 1960 and 1970 reveals that 
Mexico City, essentially the Federal District, has the lowest fertility, 
and two of the backward states the highest: Queretaro and Quintana Roo. 
It is clear that there is some general negative relationship between 
"modernity" and fertility. More detailed findings require the estimation 
of the independent effects of the various indicators that comprise modernity 
and that have some hypothesized influence. on fertility. Measuring the 
independent effects, that is, the effect of each variable holding all 
others constant, may help explain the puzzle of the Mexican birth rate. 
Multiple regression analysis has been employed to measure the influences 
on fertility of the following variables: level of education of the 
population, income, occupational structure, industrial structure, degree of 
urbanness, rate of female labor furce participation, and the sex ratio. 
Regressions have been perfonned on 1960 and 1970 data. Thus in addition 
to determining differen,tials in each censu::, year, it is also possible to 
determine how these differentials are changing over time, if at all. 
9 
Table 2 
UNADJUSTED A:'fD AWUSTED CHILD-WOMP.JI RA.TIOS 
AND ESTnlATED IlffAHT MORTALITY A.'ID mrnEP--:NUMERATIOH' 
FOR EACH STATE, 1960 AND 1970. 
1960 1970 
STATE CWR m-- u- ACWR CWR m-- u- ACWR 
A. CALIEN. 765 84.4 7.3 896.5 824 71.7 7.3 952.5 



















COAHUILA 730 68.2 o.o 783.4 760 59.7 o.o 808.3 
COLIMA 772 82 •.8 o.o 841. 7 803 63.1 o.o 857.1 
CHIAPAS 752 104.3 40.9 1182.9 764 93.6 40.9 1187.6 
CHIHUAHUA 763 75.5 o.o 825.3 772 66.3 o.o 826.8 
D.F. 633 85. 5. o.o 692.2 605 70.2 o.o 650.7 
DURANGO 804 88.7 36.4 1203.4 876 73.3 36.4 1289.3 
GUANAJUATO 781 111.4 14.5 100.6. 4 842 98.1 14.5 1069.0 
GUERRERO 715 85.5 40.5 1098.5 791 60.2 4-0. 5 1182.5 
HIDALGO 741 101.2 30.7 1077.5 801 82.0 30.7 1140.4 
JALISCO 729 84.6 o.o 796.4 794 68.6 o.o 852.5 
MEXICO 788 131+. 6 16.0 1056.3 859 117.4 16.0 1129.0 
MICHOACAN 756 75.0 28.3 1048.6 822 61.6 28.3 1123.9 
MORELOS 735 74.1 27.5 1012.1 750 . 60.4 27. 5 1017.7 
NAYARIT 771 74.2 13.7 946.9 842 55.4 13. 7 1013.5 
·N.UEVO LEON 679 57.0 o.o 720.0 749 46.5 o. 0. 785.5 
OAXACA 670 144.2 52.2 1191.6 735 125.3 52.2 1278.9 




























SINALOA 772 60.9 21.6 999.6 834 48.0 21.6 1065.2 



















TLAXCALA 805 116.3 4.0 947.4 834 96.6 4.0 960.1 
VERACRUZ 702 82.l 38.6 1060.0 750 72.0 38.6 1120.1 
YUCATAN 628 78.9 11.0 756.8 663 60.4 11.0 783.3 
ZACATECAS 831 82~1 10.5 1000.4 962 71.3 10.5 1144.6 
Source: CWR -- VIII and IX Censo General, op. cit. 
m ~ u -- Robert E. Roberts, op:-cit.
1960 
m + ACWR -- see text •
1970 
10 
Stability of the significant coefficients of the equation over time would 
provide further confirmation of significance. It is still a great leap from 
cross-section results to time-series effects, however. I will try to look 
before leaping. Each of the independent variables in the regressions is 
discussed below, followed by a presentation of the results for 1960 and 1970, 
a comparison of the sets of coefficients, and a great leap forward. ---
Education 
The level of education of a population has been shown to influence 
20·1· • • f d" It is not clear, however, why thisferti ity in a variety o stu ies. 
negative ·relationship exists: it is possible that education is a proxy 
for knowledge and efficiency in use of contraceptive techniques. It may 
also be true that education of women represents a proxy for human capital, 
h 0 21·c1· . • ldren. Education may alsoprovi ing an opportunity cost to bearing c 1 
influence parents' tastes for children, giving them the knowledge of and 
22
f 1 . f f · f · In the Mexican case,. . or a ternate satis action.opportunities orms o 
it is not unreasonable to assume that Mexicans with no education will be 
unaware of the possibility of limiting family size and/or unable to limit 
it very efficiently. Thus a variable measuring the percent of the population 
aged 15-29 with no education (E) has been entered in the regressions. 
The selection of the 15-29 age group is dictated by the statistical breakdowns 
20schultz, op. cit. , p. 25, and Alden Speare, et. al. , "Urbanization, 
Non-Familial Work-; Education, and Fertility in Taiwan," Population Studies 
(July, 1973)~ pp. 323-334. Speare, et. al. find education to be the only 
variable with a significant effect on fertility. Enough studies have been 
published on LDC fertility so that any of the explanatory variables in this 
study have a documented influence on fertility somewhere in the world. 
21This approach is exemplified by the work of Robert J. Willis, "A 
New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility," Journal of Political 
Economy, (March/April Sup. 1973) pp. Sl4-S64. 
22other possibilities are outlined by R. Michael, "Education and the 
Derived Demand for Children," JPE Sup., pp. S128-S164. 
11 
of educational attainment provided by the Censuses: ages 6-14, 15-29, and 
30 or over. Tne 15-29 group is clearly the closest approximation of the 
fertile population. 
Income 
The relationship between income and fertility has been of great in-
23terest to economists in recent years. Most of the theoretical and empir-
ical work has centered on rational households in developed countries, and 
24thus may not be directly applicable to Mexico. One point that economists 
24
k . d . k' ' 1 1 a h. b 'have been ma ing an rema ing since at east 910, owever, may e appli-
cable: that is, families with high incomes substitute "quality" for quan­
tity of children.- These families invest resources in their children in­
~ensively rcl,ther than extensively, with a negative effect on fertility. 
This phenomenon could also exist in an environment in which children are 
25considered investment g~ods. Findings on the income-fertility relation in 
26LDC's vary greatly. Schultz' results are quite mixed. A cross-national 
27
fertility study by I. Ekanem found per capita income to be relatively 
23For examples see the Supplement of the Journal of Political Economy, 
op. cit. 
- 24A dd" ' h ' . · d f ·1· h" hrecent a ition tote literature on income an erti ity w ic 
does contain discussion of LDC's is J. Simon, The Effects of Income on 
Fertili~J, Monograph 19, Carolina Population Center,Chapel Hill, 1974. 
24aL. Brentano, "The Doctrine of Malthus and the Increase of Populat iun 
in the Last Decades," Economic Journal (September, 1910), pp. 384-390, as 
quoted by Coontz, Population Theories and the Economic Explanation (London, 
1961), pp. 67-69. 
25Psychic benefits and costs of children are in general overlooked 
by economists because they are not quantifiable, not because they are 
unimportant. A first attempt to deal with this problem has been made by 
R. J. Blandy, "The Welfare Analysis of Fertility Reduction," Economic 
Journal (March, 1971q, pp. 109-129.-
260 ._£_• c1.t., p. 48-49. 
2711 A Further Note on the Relation Between Economic Development and 
Fertility," Demography (August, 1972) pp. 383-398~ 
12 
Yet B. Janowitz has shown thatinsignificant as an independent variable. 
Ekanem's data show a significant negative effect of per capi
ta income on 
ferti·1i·ty over ti·me. 
28 •28 a per capita measures of income are not available· 
• 
for the states of Mexico: the only. state income information 
is the income 
Somewhat
distribution of those reporting income, on a monthly basis. 
arbitrarily the top three classes of income earners (income o
ver 1500 pesos/ 
month) have been grouped together as the high income portion of th
e state 
most likely to substitute "quality" for quantity in fertility
 decisions. 
Thus a variable measuring the percent of the population of each 
state 
earning over 1500 pesos per month (Y) is included in the reg
ressions. Al­
though means or medians of the distributions may be preferab
le, they are 
not available. The right tail of the income distribution is 
probably cor-
related fairly closely with them, especially the mean. 
Occupation 
Sociologists have long been conce~ed with occupational mob
ility and 
29
. ff f erti·1·ity. Supposedly, higher status occupa-status and its e ects on 
tions influence parents to invest in their children more int
ensively, and 
the attempt to achieve higher status encourages the parents 
to limit the 
number of children. Recent and historical U.S. data show th
e classic 
. . 30
inverse relation between occupational status and f ert1l1ty. 
Whether 
this status di:ferential survives after controlling for educ
ation a~d incoille 
is another matter. There is some evidence for an independent
 effect in the U.S. 
A2811
cross-Section Studies as Predictors of Trends in Birth Rates
: 
Note on Ekanem' s Results", Demography (August, 1973), pp. 47
9-481. 
d f' d. h . . t 1·ve· h · 1 on in ings sowing a posi2SaDavid Heer as previous y reporte 
relation of per caoita income to fertility. " 
" 
Daedalus (Spring, 1968), pp. 447-461. 
29 A recent example is Monica Boyd, "Occupational Mobility and 
Fert ili.ty 
in Metropolitan Latin America, 11 Demography (February, 1973)
, PP· 1-18 and Refs. 
30c. Kiser, et. al., Trends and Variations in Fertility in the
 United 
States (Cambridge, 1968), Chapter 10. 
13 
in 1959. . . s· . 31 Controlling for color, maritalI contained in a table in imon, ~- cit. 
status, residence, wife's age at marriage, husband's education, and husband's 
income, a mild inverse relation between status and fertility persists. 
A measure of the percentage of the population of each state engaged in white­
collar occupations (W) has been included in the regressions to test the oc­
cupation-fertility hypothesis. 
Industry 
It is connnonplace to note that farm families derive positive economic 
benefits from children in the form of farm labor at an early age. M. Rosensweig 
has developed a comprehensive theoretical model to explain farm fertility 
behavior• in the United States. 
32 Children (and the farm wife) can and do 
serve as substitutes for hired farm labor. This benefit disappears in a non­
agricultural setting, and thus is no doubt partly responsible for the well­
knO'l•m urban-rurc1l fertility differential. To measure this phenomenon, I 
have included in the regressions a variable measuring the percent of the 
economically active population engaged in fanning (A). 
Residence 
Rural-urban fertility differentials have been observed for many years. 
33 
They are not unrelated to occupational-industrial differentials, but they 
3
½able 9, pp. 44-45. 
3211Th E . . •e conomic Determinants of Population Change in the Rural and Urban 
Sectors of the United States", Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973. 
33 .
For. example, S11:on Kuznets, "Rural-Urban Differences in Fertility: 
An International Comparison,
11 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
Vol. 118, l'{o. l, February 1974. 
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have additional elements: relative crowding, higher housing
 costs, and in­
creased opportunities for female participation in the labor 
force exist in 
cities which should have a negative influence on fertility. 
Better corrrrnuni­
cations and transportation might also make birth control kno
wledge and devices 
In Kuznets' words, "the rationale for distinguishingmore easily available. 
urban population is that the implied density of residence--a
 large number of 
families in a relatively limited area--is associated with di
stinctive patterns 
of living of the population•..
1134 I have measured the degree of urbanness 
(U) in Mexican states by the percent of the population living
 in places with 
2500 or more inhabitants. 
Female Labor Force Participation 
There has always been a strong yet not well understood inver
se relation 
between female labor force participation and fertility. Thi
s chicken-egg 
35 Either women curtail their fertilityproblem has not been solved as yet. 
in order to join the labor force, or vice-versa, or a simulta
neous decision 
on labor force part icipat ion a:i d fertility is made. The wag
e a woman could 
earn in the labor force has, in developed countries at least
, an inverse 
1 . h" her f ·1· 
36 Wage information for women is not availablere ations ip to erti ity. 
to test this hypothesis in Mexico. 
34 .Kuznets, op. cit., p. 10. 
35
An example of the difficulties encountered in determining ca
usality is 
O. Andrew Collver, "Women's Work Participation and Fertility
 in Metropolitan 
Areas," Demography, 5, 1, pp. 55-60. (1968) 
36
This was first documented by J. Mincer in "Market Prices, Op
portunity 
Costs, and Income Effects", in Measurement in Economics (Sta
nford, 1963), pp. 
75-79. 
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In any case, simply entering a labor force participation variable (LF) as 
. . h . 37I have done, mcy not tc particularly enlig tening. The labor force 
group vras chosen partly because itparticipation of the 20-24 year old age 
varied slightly more than any other 5 year age group, and partly because 
participation at these ages should have a marriage-retarding as well as a 
fertility-reducing effect. 
Sex Ratio 
The sex ratio has an important independent effect on fertility through 
its influence on age-at-marriage and marriage rates. A shortage of males, 
whether due to natural causes, or sex-specific migration, can have a nega­
tive influence on fertility.· This effect on fertility is separate from the 
short-run migration effect on child-woman ratios which has been noted above. 
The two cannot of course be sorted out in a single measure of the sex ratio, 
but by using the ratio of males to females in the key 20-29 age groups(S), 
when most men and women marry, the short-run migration effect would be 
minimized. This sex-ratio variable was used by Heer and Turner to 
38 
explain cross sectional differentials in Latin American fertility in 1960. 
37services and agriculture are employments which probably conflict 
only slightly Hith childbearing and rearing. A better measure of participa­
tion would eliminate these activities. The 1960 Census unfortunately does 
not have the necessary information to make this adjustment. In order to keep 
the regressions comparable, I have not made the correction for the 1970 data. 
3811Areal Differences in Latin American Fertility", Population Studies 
(March, 1965), pp. 279-292. 
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They found it to be have a significant positive effect on fertility, and 
considered it to be a l'esult of the sex ratio's influence on nuptiality. 
All of the variables discussed above have secular trends in Mexico 
identified with declining fertility in the theory of the demographic 
transition. It has been shown that fertility in Mexico as yet has not de­
clined in response to these changes. We are now prepared to determine 
whether these explanatory variables can explain the fertility differentials 
which existed in Mexico in 1960 and 1970. While on the ·surface it appears 
that each of the independent variables varies in the expected direction with 
fertility, it may be that their independent effects, holding all others 
constant, may reveal a different pattern, which also may be changing over 
time. The state values of all the independent variables are recorded in 
Appendix tables A2 (1960) and A3 (1970). 
The following linear additive model was tested: 
+ ... + + 
( 2) ACWRj = So+SEEj+SyY/'\,wj+SAA/SuUtSLFLF j+BSSj+E: 
in 1970 (or 1960)where: ACWR.=Adjusted child-woman ratio for state j
J 
E.=% of population 15-29 with no education
J 
y .=% of population reporting; income with income over 1500p per month 
J 
W.=% of economically active population in white-collar occupations
J 
A.=% of economically active population in agriculture
J 
U.=% of population in places of more than 2500 inhabitants
J 
LF.=labor force participation rate of 20-24 year old females 
J 




and the signs above the coefficients indicate expected effects. 
Employing all the independent variables in an ordinary least-squares 
regression (OLS) gives the following results: 
1970 
ACWR = 435.9 + 5.88 E + 2.25 Y - 12.62 W - 2.38 A - 5.63 U + 0.33 LF + 1.06 S 
(t) (0. 55)(1. 81) (0.38) (0.72) (0.53) (2.32) (0.03) (1.67) 
2
R = .733 F(7,24) = 9.39 
1960 
ACWR = 209.4 + 5.09 E + 6.98Y + 3.45 W - 3.04 A - 5.23 U - 6.24 LF + 1..21 S 
(t) (0.26) (2.15) (0.78) (0.20) (0.52) (1.70) (0.80) (1.95) 
R
2 = .722 F(7,24) = 8.89 
Although the·collection of independent variables appears to explain 
a large portion of the variation in adjusted child-woman ratios both in 
1960 and 1970, only three variables have coefficients exceeding their 
standard errors: the urbanization variable, the education variable, and 
the sex ratio. Several other variables have the wrong sign, even though 
they are insignificant: agriculture and income (1960 and 1970),labor force 
participation ( 1970 ), and occupation (1960). Part of the estimation problem 
is that many of the independent variables are highly correlated with each 
other. In fact, 92% (1970) of the variation in labor force participation 
can be explained by the other independent variables, 91% (1970) for agri­
culture, and 959.; ( 1970) for occupation. This is less true for the income 
variable, which is discussed below. 
The overall relationship is fairly stable between 1960 and 1970 for 
the significant variables, with the coefficient of the sex ratio shrinking 
18 
a little, and that for education and urbanization rising a little. Part of 
these changes are due to the fact that the dependent variable in 1970 has 
been inflated by the 1960 underenumeration estimates; the backward st.ates 
made some progress in reducing underenumeration in 1970 which is not ac­
counted for. Thus the effects of education and urbanization, which are 
correlated with underenumeration estimates, are enlarged. 
Excluding from the regressions all the insignificant variables, and 
'tntis suppress·ing multicollinearity,3Ba gives the following result: 
1970 
ACWR = 280.0 + 6.32 E - 6.09 U + 0.98 S 
(t) (0.46)(2.25) (4.00) (1. 72) 
1960 
ACWR = -124.5 + 4,74 E - 4.45 U + 1.25 S 
(t) (0.21)(2.15) (2.52) (2.33) 
R2 = .707 F(3,28) = 22.6 
These results, with the larger t-ratios for the variables, suggest 
that 71-73% of the variation in fertility in Mexico in 1960 and 1970 can be 
accounted for by variations in 'the percent of the population with no educa­
tion, percent living in urban areas, and the sex ratio. The sex ratio is 
not really a policy variable, and yet it is the only one of the three with 
a large elasticity, that is, in 1970, a 1% change in the sex ratio is asso­
ciated with a 1.5% change in fertility, while 1% changes in the other two 
38
aR2 is actually a little higher in these regressions with only 3 
independent variables. But regressions with education and urbanization 
omitted still show large R2, suggesting that multicollinearity is the problem, 
and not simply that the other variables provide no explanatory power. 
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variables are associated with .25% changes in the dependent variable. 39 
Again, the relationship is fairly stable between 1960 and 1970; part of 
the increase in magnitude of the coefficients is due to the relative 
underenumeration effect noted above. 
The other variables no doubt suffer from a variety of difficulties: 
in addition to the multicollinearity problem, LF may not be measured pro-
perly, as noted above. If labor force participation is an intermediate 
variable, including in the regression those variables such as education and 
income, which influence LFP, and through LFP, fertility, .may insure that 
its coefficient will be insignificant. The states with the highest percent 
of labor force in agriculture have large numbers of Mexican Indians, some of 
whom do not even speak Spanish. To the extent that Indians are more likely 
to be underenumerated , part ~ f . . . b . d 40the negative A sign may e explaine • But 
income (Y) is not as highly collinear as the other variables, and may perhaps 
indicate that the higher income families, ceteris paribus, do not have smaller 
numbers of children. Perhaps Mexican families do not have any incentive to sub­
stitute quality for quantity, and thus over time, rising incomes do not have 
a negative impact on fertility. 
It may be true that the regressions reported above are inefficient due 
to the presence of heteroscedastic errors. Indeed, those states whose fer­
tility observations are farthest from the regression plane all have relative-
. 41ly small popu1ations. If the nature of the heteroscedasticity is known, 
39These 1970 elasticities rep~sent the coefficients of a weighted log­
linear regression. The relative magnitudes of the elasticities suggest that 
age- and sex~specific migration patterns have a crucial bearing on differen­
tial, fertility. The 1960 elasticities were .52 for the sex ratio, .28 fo:r­
urbanization, and .09 for education, suggesting that education and the sex 
ratio were more important in 1970 than 1960. 
40Heer and Turner, op. cit. , p. 286, get the same unusual result. 
41
More sophisticated tests for heteroscedasticity seem no more powerful. 
See Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York, 1971), Chapter 8. 
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there are simple· weighting. · procedures to correct J.Or.c 1• t , 42 The correct 
weights to be applied in this case are the square roots of the populations 
43of the states. This procedure of course gives the greatest weight to the 
Federal District, but on a scale with the weight of the least populous 
state= 1, the weights of the largest states in 1970 in descending order 
are: 8.8, 6.6, 6.6, 6.1, 5.3, 5.1, 5.1, .•• , indicating that the weighting 
adjustment is not that one-sided toward the Federal District. 
In combination with the weights, a logli·near form
43a of equati·on (2) 
4ll 
was also estimated; the results of the weighted loglinear model are as follohs: 
1970 
ACWR = e-3.90E0.12y0.1Bw-0.58A-0.03u-o.12LFO.llsl.71 
(t) (0.99)(1.53)(1.62)(1.70)(.870)(1.19)(0.60){2.89) 
42 
see Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York, 1963), pp. 207-2:l. 
43
For each family within each state, the micro relation estimated is an 
F. X. F.average: _]_ = a+b i+ w.' where N~ is the fertility of the jth household,N N. J




• The variance of the errors in the state equation is then cr = w u 
N. 
J 2 1 2if:2 a = -N cr • Strictly speaking, the N. 's within a household are not
J w • w J
J 
equal, The most balanced weighting scheme is N. = total population.
J
43aRe - • 
gressions were run for both linear additive and loglinear forns. 
The loglinear seemed to give a better overall fit. Both weighted and un­
weighted regressions were run for both functional forms and the weighted 
versions were superior in both cases.This suggPsts that the "best" of the 
linear forms is the weighted loglinear. Without a formal model, I have no 
theoretical justification for preferring one form over another. 
44Th 2 . . 
e R statistic and F-test are biased upward by the weighting process 





= e1. 21Eo.14Yo .1\,-O. 20A-o. osu-o .111LF-o. 0280. 91 
( t) (0. 32 )( 2. 47)( 1. 26)(3. 49 )(1. 56 )(1. 96)( o. 32)(1. 61i) 
The major changes are in the significance of the occupation (negative) 
and income (positive) signs in the equation. The argument for a positive 
income effect on fertility is strengthened, and the sociological arguments 
for the negative effect of white-collar occupations on fertility also 
appears to be confirmed•. The sign on agriculture is persistently negative, 
although its absolute size and significance both are much smaller in 1970. 
Interpretations of the other coefficients are unchanged. The equation 
appears remarkably stable over time for the significant coefficients; 
··~ the major changes are the increased absolute sizes of the occupation and 
sex l"atio variables, which have offsetting effects on fertility. 
The model tested above on state data is difficult to apply to 
. . d 45muni c1p10 ata. .rt is impossible to correct child woman ratios 
for either infant mortality or underenumeration at the municipio level. 
The municipios .of the state of Nuevo Leon were selected for study since the 
state itself requires no underenumeration adjustment and its 1970 infant 
mortality rate was 46.5, the lowest in Mexico. While distortions in muni­
cipio CWR 1 s are thus perhaps less than for other states, they still could 
be significant. Also, the variance in the population size of municipios 
is enormous, and the weighting scheme devised above would give a highly 
skewed set of weights, with Monterrey having about 1+5 times the weight 
of the smallest municipio, and more than double that of the second largest 
municipio. To deal with heteroscedosticity in the face of this problem, 
45 
Each state has between /f and 222 municipios which are anab'.;ous 
to county divisions. 
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a non-weighted version of the model was estimated after municipios with a 
total population of less than 5,000, and Monterrey, were eliminated. The 
loglinear model again gave slightly better results, and regression for 
46 
· f 1.s· reported be1ow:t he three key variables or 1970 
(t)(l.53)(2.87)(1.81)(3.16) 
The equation is quite similar to those estimated in the state re­
gressions. It is difficult to know, however, how the use of unadjusted 
CWR's influences the results: an equation with the other explanatory 
variables included gives income and agriculture negative significant coef­
ficients. 
What have we learned from these cross-sectional investigations? The 
two most important findings are the positive sign of the income coefficient, 
which may partly explain the failure of the Mexican birth rate to decline, 
income increases offsetting declines induced by increasing urbanization (U) 
and declining numbers of the uneducated (E). Also revealing is the explana­
tory strength of the sex ratio (S). This is a disturbing finding, inasmuch 
as it cannot be expected to vary much over time, responding in a cross­
section mainly to migration patterns. It does suggest, however, that another 
key to the cross-sectional differentials which do exist is contained in 
age-sex-specific migration patterns. The sex ratio for all of Mexico did 
increase a little between 1960 and 1970, from about 912 to about 923, 
reflecting differential mortality declines among the young according to sex. 
7 
The sex ratio at birth in 1969 was l06o,'-' so it is almost certain that the 
rising trend in the (20-29) sex ratio will continue. Considering the large 
46The equation was not estimated for 1960. 
47Anuar1.o· Estad'1.st1.co,. op.c1.·t ., p. 65 • 
23 
elasticity of this variable, it is evident that its secular rise has 
had a positive effect on Mexican fertility. Its effect over the next 
decade should not be underestimated. The sex ratio in 1970 of the 10-19 
year old population was 1013.48 Using the 1959-1961 life table mortality 
estimatesf9 the ratio will only shrink to about 1007 for the 20-29 year 
olds in 1980. Applying the 1970 cross-section elasticity estimate for 
the sex ratio (1. 71) suggests a ceteris par-ibus 15% rise in fertility• 
A forward extrapolation of the 1970 results gives a rather gloomy 
picture. This is directly traceable to the fact that fertility in Mexico 
City~ which is 96.7% urban, with 33% of the economically active population 
in white collar occupations, and only 7.4% with no schooling, is about 
33 births per thousand population, extrapolating from the adjusted fer­
tility ratio of 651. The small reduction in fertility that might have 
been generated by increasing urbanization and educational attainment 1960-
1970 appears to havP been offset by the positive effects of rising income 
and the sex ratio. 
The results and implications of this study can be summarized briefly. 
First, it is clear from the data on child-woman ratios and children-ever­
born statistics, for Mexico and each state, that the constant crude birth 
rate is not masking age-or region-specific declines in fertility. This 
48Ibid, p. 33. 
49-R1 . ,au .Benitez Zenteno and Gustavo Cabrera Acevedo, Tablas Abrevi2da3 
de Mortalidad de la. Poblacion de ~-1exico (Mexico, 1967), pp. 59-60. Illegal 
and legal emigration to the United States would of course lower the sex 
ratio, making the estimated fertility effect an upper bound. It is quite
,difficult to predict or measure these emigration flows. Benit~ and Cabrera, 
Proyeccio~es ... , op. cit. actually claim that emigration is not resPonsible 
for the otherwise inexplicably low sex ratio for the 20-29 year olls. 
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constancy is surprising in light of the theory of the demographic transi­
tion (DT): levels of education and income have risen, infant mortality 
has fallen, and there has been substantial rural-urban migration. Having 
posed what is essentially a time-series problem, cross section regressions 
are employed by necessity in an attempt to explain Mexico's paradoxical 
fertility behavior. Using measures of income, education, urbanization, 
occupational status, industrial composition, labor force participation, 
and the sex ratio, in a weighted log linear form, a large portion of the 
variation in state adjusted child-woman ratios is explained by the "demo­
graphic transition" variables. The only two which might possibly explain 
the trend in Mexican fertility are the income variable and the sex ratio, 
which have positive influences on Mexican fertility in 1960 and 1970. 
Demographic transition theory does not seem to fit the Mexican case well. 
Classic cross ◄ sectional fertility differentials exist in Mexico and yet 
the trend of Mexican fertility is constant. The most advanced state 
in Mexico has a birth rate of 33 per thousand, suggesting that the demo­
graphic transition has not begun in Mexico, nor is it about to begin. 
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Table Al 
RECENT AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY IN MEXICO 
A. DISTRITO FEDERAL 1970 
% DIST. BY# OF CHILDREN ( BORN ALIVE) 
4 5 6+ CEB
AGE # of Women 0 1 2 
3 
15-19 414,375 90.5 5.9 
2.2 0.5 
1.6 1.415.6 13.1 8. 4 4.120-24 359,959 55.8 2.39513.9 11.2 8.2 9.7
25-29 270,963 29.0 12.8 1
5.2 
12.4 10.9 26.4
30-34 208,097 17.4 8.7 
11.4 12.8 
38.57.4 9.1 10.3 10.9 10.235-39 197,430 13.6 
DISTRITO FEDERAL 1960 
% DIST. BY# OF CHILDREN (BORN ALIVE)
 
2 4 5 6+ 
CEB
AGE If. of Women 0 1 
3 
15-19 261,054 91.3 5.4 
2.2 0.6 
1.7 1.157.4 13.4 13.l 8.9 4.420-24 240,054 8.8 2.22613.1 13.4 11.4 8.1
25-29 207,322 35.3 9.9 11.1 10.1 23.1
30-34 171,832 26.6 7.5 1
0.1 11.5 
8.7 31.2
35-39 153,073 24.6 7.4 
8.8 9.7 9.6 
CWR = 605 1970
= 633 1960 
1960 and 1970 Census of PopulationSource: 
26 
Table Al( cont'd) 
B. BAJA CALIFORNIA 1970 
% DIST. BY # OF CHILDREN (BORN ALIVE) 
AGE # of Women 0 1 2 3 4 5 5+ CEB 
15-19 48,860 88.4 6.3 2.7 0.8 
20-24 39,367 49.7 14.5 14.l 9.9 5.8 2.8 3.1 
25-29 30,404 23.2 9.3 13.1 14.1 12.9 ..10.4 17.0 3.090 
30-34 24,680 13.4 5.7 8.1 10.3 11.4 11.8 39.3 
35-39 22,497 10.7 5.0 6.0 7.3 8.9 9.9 52.1 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 1960 
% DIST. BY# OF CHILDREN (BORN ALIVE) 
CEBAGE # of Women 0 1 2 3 4 5 _6t 
15-19 24,746 88.5 6.5 3.1 1.0 
20-24 18,644 46.6 13.9 14.5 12.1 7.0 3.4 2.5
14.4 2.79125-29 19,595 28.4 8.0 11.4 13.5 13.5 10.8 
30-34 17,184 23.2 6.4 7.8 9.7 10.7 10.8 31.5 
7.7 8.6 8.5 38.835-39 14,592 23.1 6.5 6.7 
CWR = 736 in 1970
= 824 in 1960 
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Table Al(cont 'd) 
c. MORELOS 1970 
% DIST. BY# OF CHILDREN (BORN ALIVE) 
2 3 4- 5 6+ CEBAGE # of Women 0 l 
15-19 31,64-1 83.9 10.0 3.9 1.0 
20-24- 25,325 4-1. 7 16.3 17.2 13.0 
6.7 2.8 2.3 
15.4- 12.4- 15.2 3.124
25-29 20,875 19.7 . 9. 2 12.7 15. 4-
7.9 10.3 12.2 13.8 36.630-34- 17,24-3 13.3 5.9 10.3 51.1
35-39 17,914 11.0 5.0 5.9 7.8 
8.9 
MORELOS 1960 
% DIST. BY# OF CHILDREN (BORN ALIVE) 
4- 6+ CEBAGE # of Women 0 1 2 3 
5 
15-19 19,044- 85.3 9.0 3.7 1.1 
20-24- 16,4-93 45.1 14-.8 17.1 12.3 
6.6 2.4 1.7 
25-29 
8.2 9.5 11.4 11.8 30.5
15,168 29.7 7.9 11.8 14.8 14.0 10.
9 10.9 2. 596 
30-34- 12,032 23.4 5.2 9.3 40.2
35-39 10,517 22.9 5.1 6.6 7.4 
8.5 
CHR = 750 1970
= 735 1960 
TABLE A2: VALUES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 1960 
STATE E y w- A u LF s 
A. CALIEN. 20.1 5.2 9.4 49.2 59.8 17.2 872.0 
B. CALIF. 9.4 22.0 16.5 39.4 78.0 25.4 983.0 
B. CAL(TER) 15.4 8.9 11.1 56.3 36.1 · 24.l 1009.0 
CAMPECHE 29.2 4.2 9.5 54.6 63.3 15.0 890.0 
COAHUILA 14.5 7.1 12.0 44.8 66.7 20.2 924.0 
COLIMA 22.8 6,0 10.4 53.9 61 .8 22.1 932 .o 
CHIAPAS 54.5 3.6 4.3 79.7 24. !~ 11.2 898.0 
CHIHUAHUA 18.6 10.1 12.2 50.0 57.3 20.8 948.0 
D. F. 13.3 15. 2 .. 27.0 2.7 95.8 41.2 862.0 
DURANGO 17.5 6.4 4.1 .70. 3 35.5 14.9 975.0 
GUAHAJUATO 46.2 4.1 5,6 64.5 46.5 14.0 926.0 
GU:CPRERO 63.8 3. t+ 4.1 81.4 25.8 12.2 900.0 
HIDALGO 48.1 2.9 4.9 71.1 22.4 14.4 946.0 
JALISCO 30.5 5.9 9.6 51.9 58.6 17.6 893.0 
MEXICO 38.3 4.4 5.8 61.4 38.7 16.8 948.0 
MICHOACAN 47.0 3.7 4.4 74.0 40.6 10.6 898.0 
MORELOS 32.3 5.1 8.7 60.5 53.l 21.7 918.0 
NAYARIT 28.1 :+,2 6.4 70.9 42.8 17.9 946.0 
NUEVO LEON 14.9 10.l 15.6 32.2 7,0.4 27.0 954.0 
OAX.ACA 54.6 3.4 3.5 81.8 24.5 10.6 909.0 
PUEBLA 43.4 4. 7' 6.2 67.1 39.2 14.9 896. 0 
QUERETARO 55.4 4.5 5.6 69.8 28.0 12.4 925.0 
QUINTANAROO 30.4 6,7 9.0 69.2 31.4 14.1 1077. 0 
SANL. POTOSI 43.6 4.$ 6.4 68.8 33.7 12.1 931.0 
SIHALOA 30.2 8.3 9.1 64.6 38.l 15.8 963.0 
. SONORA 18.2 10.9 13.l 53.5 57.6 20.3 948.0 
TABASCO 31.7 5.6 7.0 70.9 26.7 9.8 906.0 
TAMAULIPAS 17.5 10.1 12.0 50.l 59.8 18.5 894.0 
TLAXCALA 32,3 2.6 5.3 68.4 43.8 14.6 931.0 
VERACRUZ 41.7 7.1 7.0 64.5 39.5 13.0 914.0 
YUCAT~! 29.5 3.9 9.8 59.0 59.8 11.9 922.0 
ZACATECAS 30.9 3.5 4: 0 80.2 27.1 9.2 921. 0 t\) 00 
Source: Derived from VIII Censo General, OE· cit. 
TABLE A.3: VALDES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 1970 


































































































































































































SOr;ORA 12.9 19.8 18.4 38.5 55.9 25.6 927.0 

























YUC/\T Ai\J' 26.9 5.8 10.9 55.1 63.9 15.3 917.0 
ZACAT:2CAS 18.2 5.1 7.9 c4.l 24.9 13.2 907.0 t0 
:.0 
Source: Derived from IX Censo General, op. cit. 
